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For the most part, the legislative changes in the Workers' Com-
pensation Act during the 1985 Regular Session were minor. Specifically,
various enactments of the session include:
- returning the reimbursement provisions under the Second
Injury Fund to their pre-1983 status of reimbursing for all
disability payments beyond the first one hundred and four weeks;'
- adding permanent hearing loss due solely to a single traumatic
accident to those events for which specific permanent partial
disability benefits may be awarded; 2
- clarifying that only those defined as "employees of the state"
(as opposed to employees of political subdivisions) are entitled
to a compensation remedy against the state;3
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1. 1985 La. Acts No. 697, amending La. R.S. 23:1377 and 23:1378 (1985). There
must have been some dissatisfaction with the change effected by the 1983 amendments,
which had attempted to limit reimbursement to total and permanent disability benefits
and to sixty percent of supplemental earnings benefits and permanent partial disability
benefits. The 1983 amendment was flawed technically and, if read literally did not clearly
provide a reimbursement scheme at all. The 1985 amendments return the provisions to
their pre-1983 reading, offering reimbursement for "disability" payments after two years
of payments have been made.
2. 1985 La. Acts No. 945, amending La. R.S. 2 3 :12 2 1(4)(p) (1985). The amendment
is to the "catch-all" provision covering disfigurement and certain losses of physical function
in the absence of disability. The provision had been severely limited in the 1983 amend-
ments, but even in its pre-1983 version, the provision had not specifically covered hearing
loss. The provision was broad enough, however,at that time to be interpreted to cover
such loss.
3. 1985 La. Acts No. 954 (effective July 23, 1985), adding La. R.S. 23:1034(D)
(1986). This is no doubt another verse in the continuing saga of compensation for "public
employees" as opposed to "public officials." See Murchison, Developments in the Law,
1982-1983-Local Govermnent Law, 44 La. L. Rev. 373, 407-410 (1983). The current
enactment also specifies that the fact that the state supplies supplemental pay to certain
employees of political subdivisions does not make those persons employees of the state
for compensation purposes "in whole or in part or in any way."
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- specifying that no compensation is due a member of the
National Guard unless the injury or death occurs during active
duty during a state of declared emergency, and that benefits
are to be calculated on the larger of his civilian or military
weekly wage; 4 and
- establishing a rebuttable presumption that a claim filed with
the Director was timely filed if received by mail on the first
legal day following the expiration of the due date.5
There were also a few minor amendments of a housekeeping 6 or
procedural7 nature.
Several of the legislative changes require more extended comment,
however. Most of the changes are the product of the interest of Senator
Sydney Nelson of Shreveport in achieving fairness in the compensation
statutes, and some of them are in turn based upon earlier observations
about the 1983 amendments in this forum.'
Permanent Partial Disability Awards
The 1983 amendments had re-named the "schedule loss" provisions
''permanent partial disability benefits" and had significantly limited their
availability by specifying that unless a loss of function exceeded fifty
percent under a specified medical rating system, there could be no award. 9
Because the rating system in question rarely accords a rating of greater
4. 1985 La. Acts No. 973 (effective July 23, 1985), amending La. R.S. 23:1211(C)
(1985).
5. 1985 La. Acts No. 884, amending La. R.S. 23:1209 (1985). The enactment was
one of two that affected 23:1209, the other being 1985 La. Acts No. 926. The two acts
do not conflict substantively, and it is assumed that the Law Institute will simply consolidate
them into a single section 1209.
6. La. R.S. 23:1225(B) (1985), relative to offsetting benefits, was clarified with
respect to receipt of unemployment compensation benefits in 1985 La. Acts No. 926
(effective January 1, 1986). La. R.S. 23:1201 (1985), relative to the time and place for
payment of weekly benefits, was amended to make it applicable to insurers as well as
employers and to delete the reference to "resulting loss of income" in the portion of the
statute describing knowledge of the injury or death. 1985 La. Acts No. 926.
7. 1985 La. Acts No. 926 amends La. R.S. 23:1310.1 (1985) to make the Director's
recommendation on a-claim admissible in a subsequent proceeding rather than inadmissible
but does not accord the recommendation a presumption of correctness as to the facts or
the law. The Act amends R.S. 23:1312 (1985) to add the domicile of a dependent in a
death case as a proper venue in actions against the state. And finally, the Act amends
La. R.S. 23:1319 (1985) to remove the limitation of taking depositions to the time period
after receiving the recommendation of the Director; such depositions may be taken at
any time to preserve testimony.
8. Johnson, Bound in Shallows and Miseries: The 1983 Amendments to the Workers'
Compensation Statute, 44 La. L. Rev. 669 (1984).
9. La. R.S. 23:1221 (4)(1985).
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than fifty percent of the loss, the net effect was to eliminate potential
permanent partial disability benefits in almost all cases.
This limitation was overly severe, and Act 926 of the 1985 Regular
Session scaled it back to a standard of "greater than twenty-five percent"
loss of function before benefits could be paid. 0 The amendment also
refers to the latest edition of the rating system to be used to determine
the percentage loss of function.'
Calculation of Supplemental Earnings Benefits
In a compromise effort, the 1983 amendments had fixed the method
of calculating supplemental earnings benefits in a rather cumbersome
formula: seventy-four percent of the difference between ninety percent
of the pre-injury monthly wage and the amount of monthly wage the
worker is able to earn after the injury. 2 The worker who was able to
earn ninety percent or more of his pre-injury monthly wage would be
entitled to no supplemental earnings benefits.
The 1985 amendments to the applicable section retain the latter
feature of the formula. A worker who earns or is able to earn ninety
percent or more of his pre-injury monthly wage is not entitled to any
supplemental earnings benefits.' 3 However, if a worker falls below that
level in his post-injury earnings or ability to earn, he is entitled to two-
thirds of the difference between his pre-injury monthly wage and his
post-injury monthly wage."' This is, in fact, the pre-1983 formula (then
called permanent partial disability benefits), though with the overlay of
the ceiling on benefits once the worker reaches the ninety percent-of-
prior-wage level.
The most recent amendments are a decided improvement over the
state of the law after the 1983 amendments, if for no other reason than
that the mathematical calculation i easier. However, the retention of
the ninety percent-of-prior-wage ceiling leaves a curious anomaly. A
worker who was earning $1,000.00 per month prior to his injury and
$900.00 a month after his injury is entitled to no supplemental earnings
benefits, and his aggregate post-injury income is $900.00. A worker who
earns $850.00 post-injury falls below the ninety percent level and is
entitled to two-thirds of the difference between $1,000.00 and $850.00,
or a benefit of $100.00. His net post-injury income is then $950.00-
10. La. R.S. 23:1221 (4)(q)(1985), as amended by 1985 La. Acts No. 926. See generally,
Johnson, supra note 8, at 681-84.
II. La. R.S. 23:1211(4)(q)(1985), as amended by 1985 La. Acts No. 926.
12. La. R.S. 23:1221(3)(a)(1985), as amended by 1983 La. Acts, Ex. Sess., No. I.




$850.00 in earned wages and $100.00 in supplemental earnings benefits.',5
The mathematical hypotheticals could be continued, but the point is
made. Down to a certain post-injury wage level, the worker who falls
below the ninety percent level will fare better in the aggregate than the
worker who barely reaches the ninety percent level. There is no apparent
reason for the difference, unless the interest of the employer in paying
nothing to certain workers is greater than his interest in paying certain
other workers (those just below the ninety percent level) amounts that
will bring them over the critical ninety percent figure.' 6
It is likely that the two sides of the equation for the employer or
carrier will come out just about even. The amounts that the employer
or carrier saves in not paying benefits at all to the ninety-percent-or-
better employees will probably be paid out to the eighty to eighty-five
percent wage level employees. It would probably be better to return to
the pre-1983 formula which worked well in practice and was very familiar
to claimants and carriers.
Benefits for Part-Time Workers
One of the least-discussed but most significant of the 1983 changes
was a shift in legislative philosophy with regard to part-time workers.
Prior to 1983, the jurisprudence had established that even though an
employee was working part-time for a given employer his compensation
if injured in that employment would be based upon a forty-hour work
week.' 7 In other words, the worker's earning capacity father than his
actual wage level was protected.
The 1983 amendments overruled that jurisprudential principle and
replaced it with a scheme under which an employee who knowingly
accepted a position classified by the employer as a part-time position
could only expect benefits based on the actual number of hours worked
in that position, if he were injured while in that employment.' This
change was criticized because it exposed the part-time worker to a loss
15. His net post-injury income is not two-thirds of the difference between ninety
percent of the prior wage and the present wage or ability to earn, which would in fact
have significantly lowered the amount of the benefits.
16. It is not beyond the realm of possibility that a worker would choose a post-
injury wage level of just under ninety percent of his prior wage because his aggregate
"take-home" pay would be greater than it would be if he were at ninety percent of his
prior wage. This amount would also be slightly ameliorated by the fact that the com-
pensation-benefit portion would not be subject to income taxation.
17. Constant v. State, 272 So. 2d 675 (La. 1973); Fontenot v. Kinder, 377 So. 2d
554 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979); Alexander v. Reed, 350 So. 2d 179 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1977).
18. La. R.S. 23:1021(10)(a)(ii)-(iii) (1985).
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of full earning capacity when full-time workers were not similarly ex-
posed. 19
The 1985 amendments attempt to find a middle ground between the
two extremes. New section 1261 in the Act provides that when an
employee is employed in "successive" employments, the employer in
whose employ he is injured owes him applicable compensation. Section
1261 also provides that the benefits will be based either on the average
weekly hours which the employee works in all of his employment or
on forty hours, whichever is less.20 This will benefit the "part-time"
worker who is actually working forty hours or more in two or more
employments. It will concomitantly limit the worker who is truly "part-
time," working in a less than forty-hour position and holding no other
job, to protection of the earning capacity that he is choosing to use at
that time.
This solution will not protect all workers, whatever their actual
choice of working hours, as the prior jurisprudential position would
have; but as a compromise, the solution seems much fairer than the
state of the law after the 1983 amendments.
Compromise with Tortfeasor
The 1983 amendments had imposed severe sanctions on the employee
and on an alleged tortfeasor who might settle the employee's tort claim
without giving adequate protection to the reimbursement claim of the
employer or the carrier for compensation paid. Specifically, section 1102
was amended to provide that an employee who settles with a tortfeasor
without written approval from the employer or the insurer forfeits any
right to future compensation beyond the amount that he recovers from
the settlement. 2' He may preserve the right to future compensation by
giving notice of the institution of his suit to either the employer or the
insurer and by then securing their approval for a proposed compromise. 2
If the employee fails to discharge that responsibility, he still has
the right to "buy back" his future compensation. To do so, the 1983
amendments require that the employee pay to the employer or to the
insurer "the total amount of compensation benefits, medical benefits,
attorney's fees and penalties, previously paid to or on behalf of the
employee . . . " subject to a ceiling of fifty percent of the compromise
amount. The requirement that the employee repay any attorney's fees
19. Johnson, supra note 8, at 701-03.
20. La. R.S. 23:1261(1985), added by 1985 La. Acts No. 926.
21. La. R.S. 23:1102(B), as amended by 1983 La. Acts Ex. Sess., No. 1.
22. La. R.S. 23:1102(A)-(B) (1985). 1985 La. Acts No. 926 adds a similar provision
with respect to securing the written approval of the compromise by an employer which
is self-insured, in whole or in part.
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and penalties which he might have received was criticized because it
seemed to reward the employer or carrier which had so delayed payment
of the original compensation claim that it had been assessed penalties
and attorney's fees. 23
Act 926 of 1985 deletes the requirement that the employee include
repayment of penalties and attorney's fees in his "buy-back" of com-
pensation rights, thus eliminating the objectionable aspect of the pro-
vision which had effectively forced the employee to return the statutory
penalty for unreasonable delay to the employer or carrier. The employee
need only repay the amount of weekly and medical benefits which he
had received or which had been paid on his behalf. 24
Prescription with Respect to Medical Expenses
The decision during this term in Lester v. Southern Casualty In-
surance Co.,2S discussed in a later portion of this symposium article,
caused a considerable stir and produced a prompt legislative overruling
in Act 926 of 1985. In fact, it is quite possible that the opinion-quite
unfavorable to employers and carriers-gave life to Senator Nelson's
bill which it might not otherwise have had. A modification of Lester
gave employers a reason to legislate with respect to the compensation
statutes and may have given them reason to compromise on other issues
as well.
The Lester opinion held that the only prescriptive period applicable
to claims for medical expenses is the Civil Code's general ten-year
prescriptive period applicable to all personal actions which do not have
specific prescriptive periods. 26 Amendments to section 1209 by Acts 926
of 1985 choose a shorter prescriptive period and generally parallel the
rules respective to claims for supplemental earnings benefits.
Where no payments of any kind have been made for medical ex-
penses, the right to make a claim for such payments prescribes "one
year after the accident." 27 When any payments have been made, the
claim prescribes "three years from the time of making the last payment
of medical benefits." ' 28 The symmetry with claims for supplemental earn-
ings benefits is helpful, and the three-year period seems to be a good
compromise between the shorter period established by the cases prior
to Lester and the excessive period decreed by Lester.
23. Johnson, supra note 8, at 696-701.
24. La. R.S.23:1102(B) (1986), as amended by 1985 La. Acts No. 926.
25. 466 So. 2d 25 (La. 1985).
26. Former La. Civ. Code art. 3544 (1870), now art. 3499 (1984).
27. La. R.S. 23:1209(B) as amended by 1985 La. Acts No. 926.
28. La. R.S. 23:1209(B) (1986), added by 1985 La. Acts No. 926.
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Introduction of Comparative Negligence Into Employer
Reimbursement Scheme
It was only a matter of time before the useful and flexible concept
of comparative negligence found its way into the fringes of the Com-
pensation Act. It has been observed elsewhere that contributory negli-
gence and its all-or-nothing philosophy served fitfully, at best, as a way
of adjusting differences between a tortfeasor and an employer seeking
reimbursement for compensation paid when his employment enterprise
shared responsibility for the loss.29 The Louisiana cases had arrived at
the explicable but nonetheless inconsistent position that an employer was
barred from recovering from a tortfeasor any compensation paid to a
negligent employee" but could recover completely any compensation paid
when a co-employee shared responsibility with the tortfeasor for the
injury."
Amendments wrought by Act 931 of 1985 interject comparative
negligence into this dispute to adjust the equation. As amended, section
1101(B) now provides that the recovery of the carrier or the employer
on the reimbursement claim "shall be identical in percentage" to the
recovery of the claimant against the tortfeasor. When the recovery of
the claimant is "decreased as a result of comparative negligence," the
recovery of the employer or carrier "shall be reduced by the same
percentage. '32
This change seems fair and, actually, only brings the law applicable
to employer or carrier reimbursement into symmetry with the law ap-
plicable to the injured employee's claim, which is clearly subject to
reduction under comparative negligence rules if the tortfeasor can provide
that the injured employee's fault contributed to his injury. The net effect
of the change is to place some of the responsibility for compensation
on the employment enterprise when both the injured employee and the
tortfeasor were at fault.
There is no change, however, in the other parts of the puzzle. An
employer or a carrier will still be entitled to undiminished reimbursement
when neither the injured employee nor any other person in the em-
ployment enterprise shares the fault for the injury. However, an employer
or a carrier is entitled to undiminished reimbursement if an employee
other than the injured employee shares fault with the tortfeasor (for
29. W. Malone & A. Johnson, Workers' Compensation Law and Practice § 371, in
14 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise 191-206 (2d ed. 1980).
30. See, e.g., Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. Reed, 355 So. 2d 952 (La. App. 3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 356 So. 2d 1001 (La. 1977), which now must be regarded as modified by
1985 La. Acts No. 931.
31. Vidrine v. Michigan Millers Mut. Ins. Co., 263 La. 300, 268 So. 2d 233 (1972).
32. La. R.S. 23:1101(B) (1986), as amended by 1985 La. Acts No. 931.
19861
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
example, when the injured employee is a passenger in a vehicle being
driven negligently by a co-employee). 3 This is not necessarily a good
result, particularly since there is very little difference in the effort the
employer would have to exert to encourage either employee to behave
in a safe manner. The amendment is a step in the right direction, and
it is likely that the same principle will soon be extended to the instance
of reimbursement when it is a co-employee rather than the injured
claimant who shares fault with the tortfeasor.
There is a hiatus in the enactment which might be remedied either
by judicial interpretation or by a subsequent amendment. The recent
change refers only to the effect of the claimant's negligence on the
employer's reimbursement claim. It does not address the rare but possible
situation in which the employer himself might be personally negligent
or of other fault. Presumably, there is no longer any foundation for
the jurisprudential rule that the reimbursement of such an employer
would be wholly barred. More likely, the same reduction on the basis
of comparative negligence specifically made applicable to the claimant's




Those who felt that the generally pro-employer slant given to the
Act by the 1983 amendments was impervious to judicial erosion may
have been only partially correct. The evidence shows that in some
instances the judiciary has the desire and the ingenuity to balance the
scales of the compromise between employer and employee in ways that
might not have been anticipated. It is historically demonstrable that the
judiciary consistently attempts to strike a fair balance by making a pro-
employer act less so and making a pro-employee act fairer to employer
interests. Louisiana judges have followed this pattern since the inception
of the Act, and it was probably shortsighted of the 1983 drafters to
think that they had totally eliminated such a possibility.
33. This was in fact the situation in Vidrine, 263 La. 300, 268 So. 2d 233 (1972).
See discussion supra, text accompanying note 26.
34; There were other rumblings in the area during this term, though not precisely
on the same point. In dicta in Cambre v. Tassin Amphibious Equipment Corp., 464 So.
2d 878 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 240 So. 2d 903 (La. 1985), the court observed
that the rule of Lejeune v. Highlands Ins. Co., 287 So. 2d 531 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 290 So. 2d 903 (La. 1974), that a tortfeasor could not seek contribution from
an employer for loss caused concurrently by the tortfeasor and an employee, might not
have survived the enactment of comparative negligence. The court suggested that com-
parative negligence might be used to permit a reduced recovery in such an instance but




It was predicted earlier in this forum that judges might find ways
of tinkering with the Act at its fringes rather than at its core, the latter
having been the primary area modified by the 1983 amendments." There
are indications that this process is under way, although the evidence
does not yet preponderate on one side or the other.
Certainly the employer community can be pleased that the judiciary
is apparently not going to authorize recovery of loss of consortium by
designated beneficiaries for a work-related injury.36 This seems a proper
result, although there was the potential for judicial reaction to "even
up" the sides.
However, there are less than encouraging indications from some
other quarters. For instance, the number of cases in this term in which
a claim based on an intentional tort was disposed of on a peremptory
exception or a motion for summary judgment37 was greatly outweighed
by the number of decisions in which the defendant had to go deeper
into the litigation to attempt to extricate itself.38 Dicta in Cambre v.
Tassin Amphibious Equipment Corp.3 9 suggests that the adoption of
comparative negligence may prompt a change in the rule that a tortfeasor
35. Johnson, supra note 8.
36. See Theriot v. Damson Drilling Corp., 471 So. 2d 757 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 472 So. 2d 907 (La. 1985), in which the appellate court held that the claim for
loss of consortium by a spouse for a work-related injury was also barred by the exclusivity
provisions of the Act.
37. Brown v. Ebasco Services, Inc., 461 So. 2d 443 (La. App 5th Cir. 1984), rev'd
on other grounds, 462 So. 2d 1235 (La. 1985) (incantation of Mayer and "magic words"
like intent or intentional insufficient to survive motion for summary judgment); Hamm
v. Precision Rebuilders, Inc., 470 So. 2d 308 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1985) (summary judgment
affirmed).
38. Williams v. Ingredient Technology Corp., 470 So. 2d 283 (La. App. 5th Cir.
1985) (summary judgment inappropriate in factual situation of supervisor overriding em-
ployee's objections to particilar instruction); Ewert v. Georgia Cas. & Surety Co., 468
So. 2d 13 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 472 So. 2d 920 (La. 1985) (sixteen-year-old
suffered fatal injury in logging operations; Mayer specifically cited as reason why exception
of no cause of action should not have been sustained); Yousufali v. Southland Corp.,
467 So. 2d 191 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985) (convenience-store clerk alleged intentional failure
to provide adequate security after he was struck by robber; Mayer cited as basis for
reversing the sustaining of exception of no cause of action); Goodman v. Dixie Mach.
Welding & Metal Works, 467 So. 2d 61 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1985) (alleged intentional
exposure to lung irritants; exception of no cause of action sustained at trial court level
and reversed on appeal); McCormick v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours, 464 So. 2d 826 (La.
App. 5th Cir.), cert. denied, 466 So. 2d 1294 (La. 1985) (explosion and fire; insufficient
basis for summary judgment in employer's favor); O'Neill v. Johns-Manville Corp., 463
So. 2d 671 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1985) (asbestosis; exception of no cause of action reversed);
Cupp v. Federated Rural Elec. Ins. Co., 459 So. 2d 1337 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1984) (death
while working on electrical line; exception of no cause of action and summary judgment
decided adversely to defendant on appeal).
39. 464 So. 2d 878 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 466 So. 2d 1302 (La. 1985).
The court ultimately determined that the case was not controlled by Louisiana law.
19861
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
may not seek contribution or indemnity against an employer whose
enterprise bore some of the responsibility for the injury suffered by an
employee. 40 Should this be the case, the way will be open for an employer
or its liability carrier to bear a part of the tort damage payable to the
injured employee in his tort action. Such a result would be a significant
erosion of the underlying rationale and should be regarded with concern
by the employer community.
Moreover, the decision in Adams v. Denny's, Inc.,4 discussed later
in this symposium, may revive the rationale of Boyer v. Crescent Paper
Box Factory, Inc.,'4 that if an injury is work-related but not compensable
under the Act, the injury is actionable in tort. The decision may be
more limited than that, but it at least raises that possibility. The decision
in Lester v. Southern Casualty Co.,43 though legislatively overruled shortly
thereafter, that claims for medical expenses are subject only to a ten-
year prescriptive period, is also an indication of continuing judicial
liberality in interpreting the Act.
These developments have not occurred in a vacuum. The judiciary
can read the Act as well as anyone and can reach its own decisions
with respect to its cant after the 1983 amendments. The lesson to be
learned is that there is very little to be gained by a one-sided Act,
whether the imbalance is legislatively or judicially created. The closer
to the middle that we strike the balance, the fewer the opportunities
there will be for legislators or judges to feel the need to tinker with
the system.
Cause of Action for Wrongful Death of Fetus
The Louisiana Supreme Court's decision in 1981 in Danos v. St.
Pierre," holding that parents have a right to recover for the wrongful
death of their unborn child, had a predictable impact on the Compen-
sation Act during this term. In Adams v. Denny's, Inc.,45 a waitress
had fallen during her work, and the incident allegedly led to the death
of her unborn child. She and her husband sued the employer in tort
for the wrongful death of the fetus, and she also sought compensation
for her own injuries. A partial summary judgment had been rendered
by the trial court with respect to the former claim, but the appellate
court reversed.
40. Lejeune v. Highlands Ins. Co., 287 So. 2d 531 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied,
290 So. 2d 903 (La. 1974), is usually cited for that proposition.
41. 464 So. 2d 876 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 467 So. 2d 530 (La. 1985).
42. 143 La. 368, 78 So. 596 (1918).
43. 466 So. 2d 25 (La. 1985).
44. 402 So. 2d 633 (La. 1981).
45. 464 So. 2d 876 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 467 So. 2d 530 (La. 1985).
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A number of years ago, a similar claim for the wrongful death of a fetus
was rejected, at least partially on the ground that Louisiana law did not rec-
ognize such a cause of action. 46 Once the cause of action was recognized in
general tort law, it was only a matter of time until fate would again bring such
a case to the judicial system. The defendant cited the earlier case, but the court
obviously felt that, in light of Danos, a different result was required. The court
reasoned that if the employee had brought her two-month-old child to the
work place and the infant had been killed by the negligence of the employer,
there would be no serious contention that the employer could not be liable to
the parents for the wrongful death of the child. If Danos stands for the prop-
osition that the parents have the same interest in the fetus as they do in a living
child, then the court's reasoning is difficult to dispute.
Perhaps there is no compelling reason to be critical of the decision
on the facts presented. The only disturbing aspect of the decision is its
future import. Does the decision indicate that there will be a revival of
the concept that was first recognized in Boyer v. Crescent Paper Box
Factory, Inc.4 1 that if the Act does not actually accord the employee a
remedy for a loss suffered through a work-related incident, the employee
may then sue in tort? Properly understood, the mother's cause of action
is for loss to an employee, not to the non-employee child. It is not a
difficult logical process to move from this type of loss (largely emotional)
for which the Act does not afford a remedy to other kinds of loss for
which there is no recovery under the Act, although the injury-causing
"event" is work-related. 4 If the larger principle is indeed what underlies
the court's decision, we may confidently expect to see more of the
Adams rationale in the future.
Prescription on Claims for Medical Expenses
The supreme court unleashed a bombshell-perhaps the only one
of the term-in its decision in Lester v. Southern Casualty Co. 49 The
claimant had suffered the loss of his left foot and a part of his left
leg in a work-related accident in 1970. He was fitted with an artificial
limb and received the then-maximum 500 weeks of weekly benefits, the
last one being paid in 1980. Substantial medical expenses were also paid,
and the last such payment was made on January 25, 1980.
During the period from August, 1981 to October, 1982, the claimant
incurred additional medical expenses which were primarily related to the
46. Bergeron v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 243 La. 108, 141 So. 2d 832 (1962).
47. 143 La. 368, 78 So. 596 (1918). The decision produced the language which now
appears as La. R.S. 23:122 1(4)(p) (1986), affording a remedy for non-disabling disfig-
urement or loss of physical function.
48. See W. Malone & A. Johnson, supra note 24, § 365 at 157-61.
49. 466 So. 2d 25 (La. 1985).
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artificial limb. In late 1982, the carrier denied payment for those ex-
penses, and suit was instituted on December 22, 1982. Both lower courts
felt that the claim for the additional medical expenses was prescribed,
having been instituted more than a year after the last medical payment.5 "
The supreme court granted a writ and reversed.
The lower courts had followed earlier jurisprudence in applying the
same prescriptive period to medical-expense claims that was applied to
weekly benefit claims because the Act itself was silent on the specific
issue of medical-expense claims.' Obviously uncomfortable with the
result of the facts before it,52 the supreme court overruled its own
precedent53 on the issue and held that absent a clear statement in the
Act as to time period, the claim could be governed only by the general
ten-year prescription of the Civil Code with respect to personal actions.
Justice Lemmon concurred, but reasoned that the one-year prescrip-
tive period in the Act previously applied to medical expenses should be
interpreted to begin to run only when the expense was actually incurred.
He concluded that the employer's liability for both weekly benefits and
medical expenses was already established and that the prescriptive period
should simply be applied when that liability was actually called into
question.
Neither the majority opinion nor the concurrence was the final word
on the subject. The chosen period was too long, and the legislature
promptly remedied the situation by enacting a specific prescriptive period
in the Act for medical expenses. The legislature chose a scheme that
was virtually identical to that for supplemental earnings benefits. If no
payments have been made, the claim for medical expenses prescribes
one year from the accident. If payments have been made, the claim
prescribes three years from the date of the last payment.14
Retaliatory Discharge Cases
Louisiana has had a retaliatory discharge provision in its Compen-
sation Act for only five years. 5 Thus, it is understandable that there
have been few judicial interpretations. But there have been enough
decisions to permit an outline of judicial reaction to the provision and
to provoke some very brief comments here.
The retaliatory discharge provision prohibits the denial of employ-
ment or the discharge from employment of an employee on the ground
50. See Lester v. Southern Cas. Ins. Co., 458 So. 2d 654 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1984).
51. See W. Malone & A. Johnson, supra note 24, § 384 at 257.
52. The court observed that if it adhered to its earlier decisions, some medical expenses
might have prescribed before the injured employee had a right to assert a claim for them.
53. Brown v. Travelers Ins. Co., 247 La. 7, 169 So. 2d 540 (1964).
54. 1985 La. Acts No. 926, amending La. R.S. 23:1209 (1985).
55. 1980 La. Acts No. 704, adding La. R.S. 23:1361 (1985).
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that he has asserted a claim for compensation. It is an attempt to
strengthen the remedies accorded to an employee by imposing an ad-
ditional sanction on the employer if he should retaliate against an
employee who seeks those remedies. If the claimant proves a retaliatory
discharge, he is entitled to recover a "civil penalty," which is the
equivalent to one year's earnings in the position sought but denied or
from which he was discharged. He is also entitled to reasonable attorney's
fees.
In the first decision interpreting this provision, the third circuit court
of appeal held that a worker discharged for filing a claim under the
FELA was entitled to the state law remedy for retaliatory discharge.16
Shortly thereafter, the fourth circuit held that a classified civil service
employee had to exhaust his administrative remedies before he was
entitled to bring the action outlined by section 1361 . 7 Another decision
supplied a prescriptive period which had not been supplied by the
legislature-the general one-year tort prescription.18
With these jurisdictional and procedural skirmishes out of the way,
subsequent cases turned to a delineation of the provision's substance.
Cases of recovery and denial of recovery are approximately even, as
might be expected in an area which will of necessity be very fact-
oriented. The two instances of denial of recovery center on plaintiff's
failure to discharge the burden of proving the causal connection between
his dismissal and the filing of the compensation claim and on the court's
belief that the dismissal was due to the claimant's failure to return to
work after his injury.5 9  In the decisions in which the employee has
been successful, the court has had to reach the question of the measure
of recovery. In Turner v. Winn Dixie Louisiana, Inc., 60 the employee
was awarded his full year's earnings even though the evidence showed
that he had been employed elsewhere during that year. He also received
$5,000.00 in attorney's fees. In Collier v. Pellerin Milnor Corp.,6 1 the
court included within the calculation of a full year's earnings a profit-
sharing bonus to which the employee would have been entitled, but the
court could not decide the issue of employer-paid insurance premiums
on the basis of the record before it. The employee also received $2,500.00
in attorney's fees.
56. Wiley v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 430 So. 2d 1015 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 431 So. 2d 1055 (La. 1983).
57. Hillard v. Housing Authority, 436 So. 2d 685 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983).
58. Arvie v. Century Tel. Enters., Inc., 452 So. 2d 392 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1984).
59. Moore v. McDermott, Inc., 469 So. 2d 1207 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1985); Vollenweider
v. New Orleans Public Serv., Inc., 466 So. 2d 804 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 468
So. 2d 577 (La. 1985).
60. 474 So. 2d 966 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1985).
61. 463 So. 2d 47 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1985).
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In the only case to reach the supreme court, recovery was granted,
with the observation that the appellate court should be very wary of
replacing the trial judge's determination on the issue (which had been
favorable to the plaintiff) with its own. 62
No case has squarely decided the issue of whether the statutory civil
penalty is the claimant's exclusive remedy, but there is a strong inference
from these various decisions that this is the case. If the Legislature has
seen fit to grant a specific remedy for a specific evil, it is difficult to
argue that it also meant that the aggrieved claimant could seek additional
amounts (mental distress or punitive damages, for example). There will,
no doubt, be additional decisions forthcoming on this issue and others
yet unresolved in the area of retaliatory discharge.
62. Ducote v. J. A. Jones Constr. Co., 471 So. 2d 704, 706 (La. 1985).
